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Intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or 
avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves.1 In short, intellectual vice constitutes 
a motivation actively to turn away from the epistemic good. This view, or something like it, 
has recently come under attack (Cassam 2016; Crerar 2017). In this paper I argue that 
arguments denying that such epistemically bad motivations are necessary to character vices 
neglect an important distinction between two kinds of explanation of action and belief. The 
first rationalises them by offering motivating reasons in their support; the second makes 
these beliefs and actions intelligible in terms of reasons that explain them. Both kinds of 
explanation invoke motives. Opponents of motivational accounts of vices focus their 
discussions on motivating reasons but fail to consider the motives presented in mere 
explanations of actions and belief. 
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There are, as is well known, two approaches to virtue in epistemology. Virtue reliabilists 
think of virtues as cognitive faculties or capacities, such as memory or perception, that are 
in ordinary circumstances reliable (Sosa 2007). Virtue responsibilists claim that virtues are 
character traits with their distinctive motivations (Zagzebski 1996). In its clearest example, 
which is found in Zagzebski (1996, 2003), the view states that each intellectual virtue is 
individuated by its distinctive proximate motivation. These virtues, however, also share one 
ultimate motive, which is love of truth or of cognitive contact with reality. This is a 
motivation to seek non-instrumentally, something that is epistemically good in itself.2 It is 
therefore natural to ask whether bad motivations may be essential to intellectual vices in 
the same way in which good motives are said by responsibilists to be defining of virtue. 
There is a small but growing literature addressing this issue either directly or indirectly. 
Heather Battaly has suggested, for example, that vices may have distinctively bad 
motivations (2016, 2015), while Linda Zagzebski (1996) at times indicates that vice is defined 
by the absence of good motivations. Finally, Quassim Cassam (2016) and Charlie Crerar 
(2017) have defended the view that individuals may possess epistemic vices despite having 
some good motivations. In this essay I argue that once the notion of motivation is properly 
understood, the objections against the view that intellectual vices have characteristic bad 
epistemic motivations can be shown to be ill founded. Further, I show that the view that 
epistemic vices have these distinctive motives can be independently motivated. There is, 
however, an important disanalogy between virtues and vices because there is no ultimate 
motive that is common to all vices. 
The essay consists of three sections. The first details some counterexamples to the view that 
epistemic character vices require epistemically bad motives, or at least the absence of good 
motivations. The second section shows that once the motivations involved in these 
hypothetical cases are properly understood, all of these examples involve non-instrumental 
aversion to epistemic goods. Hence, the challenge to motivational accounts of vices based 
on them is shown to fail. In the third and final part of the essay, I distinguish motivating 
from explanatory reasons for belief and action. I argue that once it is accepted that 
explanatory reasons can be motives, our epistemic practice of vice attribution supplies some 
evidence in favour of motivational accounts of vice. 
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<A, CENTERED>1 
May intellectual character vices require non-instrumental motives to oppose, avoid, or 
antagonise things that are epistemically good in themselves?3 There are intellectual vices 
that seem to involve such motives: epistemic malevolence, for example. Jason Baehr 
characterises this vice as the opposition to the epistemic good as such (or for its own sake) 
iŶ all its iŶĐaƌŶatioŶs oƌ to otheƌs͛ shaƌe iŶ it ;ϮϬϭϬ, ϭϵϮ, ϮϬϰͿ. He defiŶes suĐh oppositioŶ iŶ 
volitional terms. The person who is epistemically malevolent acts out of an ill will. He is 
driven by the motive universally to antagonise, block, or prevent what he regards as 
epistemically good, or to put obstacles in the way of the acquisition by some person of her 
share of this good. That is to say, malevolent motives may target specific people, or they 
may be directed impersonally to the epistemic good itself.4 A person may be malevolent for 
ŵaleǀoleŶĐe͛s sake. He ŵaǇ ďe ill ǁilled toǁaƌd otheƌs foƌ Ŷo fuƌtheƌ puƌpose thaŶ seeiŶg 
their share in epistemic goods languish and decline. It is also possible to harbour malevolent 
motives for instrumental purposes. For instance, an individual may, out of arrogance, want 
to acquire some epistemic goods for herself which she is not prepared to share with others. 
Hence, she may also malevolently keep other people ignorant as a means to her goal of 
becoming intellectually superior to them. 
Baehr seems to think that a motive is either final or instrumental, but not both (2010, 192). 
If this is his view, it is mistaken. It is possible for one person to be at the same time 
motivated by malevolence for its own sake and as a means to a further end. The person who 
initially behaves malevolently for the sake of feeling intellectually superior to others may 
eǀeŶtuallǇ loǀe ďeiŶg ŵaleǀoleŶt foƌ ŵaleǀoleŶĐe͛s sake. WheŶ this happeŶs, his aĐtioŶs 
may be simultaneously motivated both non-instrumentally and instrumentally by 
antagonism to the epistemic good. 
Baehr discusses some fictional and actual examples of epistemic malevolence such as 
O͛BƌieŶ iŶ Geoƌge Oƌǁell͛s 1984 aŶd “ophie Auld as desĐƌiďed iŶ FƌedeƌiĐk Douglass͛s 
autobiography. The latter, after having taught Douglass the rudimentary elements of 
reading, is transformed into an epistemically malevolent individual by the corrupting 
influence of her husband. Hence, she starts to oppose angrily and actively impede the 
attempts by Douglass to read and acquire knowledge, whilst openly displaying her contempt 
for him and his pursuit of self-education. 
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Ill ǁill toǁaƌd otheƌs͛ iŶtelleĐtual flouƌishiŶg is ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ the ǀiĐe of episteŵiĐ 
malevolence.5 The person who blocks, antagonises, or actively prevents other people from 
acquiring epistemic goods is not best thought malevolent if she does not act out of ill will. 
To see why this is the case consider the example mentioned above of an intellectually 
arrogant person who behaves malevolently out of a desire to be intellectually superior to 
otheƌ people. IŶ so faƌ as this peƌsoŶ atteŵpts to ďloĐk otheƌs͛ aĐĐess to epistemic goods, he 
behaves in the same way as a malevolent person would. He may, however, not be 
malevolent himself.  
He may instead think of people that they are a threat to his quest for intellectual 
superiority. But, if they were not a threat, he would have no interest in denying them access 
to the epistemic good. Hence, he considers them to be obstacles rather than his enemies. 
Therefore, this person does not seem to harbour malevolence toward others; rather, he 
tries to crush them only when they are in his way. If he has nothing to gain from putting 
them down, he will leave them alone. It is plausible to conclude that we would not 
characterise this person as malevolent, because he harbours no ill will toward these people, 
although we would think of him as viciously arrogant. Thus, here we have an intellectual 
vice that requires the presence of a non-instrumental motive to oppose the epistemic good 
as such. Ill will may also be sufficient for epistemic malevolence, since it is plausible to think 
of an ill-willed person who ineptly ends up promoting the acquisition of epistemic goods as 
being epistemically malevolent, even though ineffectual.  
I have argued that the possession of a non-instrumental motive to make the epistemic good 
oŶe͛s eŶeŵǇ is ďoth necessary and sufficient for malevolence. For the purpose of a defence 
of the motivational view, it is also important to note that this is a motive that is bad in itself, 
rather than merely because of its effects or contributions to something else that is bad. The 
motive of malevolence is bad in itself because it is the enemy of what is in itself 
epistemically good.6 
The view that intellectual vice requires non-instrumental epistemically bad motivations has 
its supporters. The clearest pronouncements in this regard have been offered by Battaly, 
who has often stated that there is a plausible (responsibilist) conception of epistemic vices 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh theǇ aƌe ͞paƌtlǇ Đoŵposed of ďad episteŵiĐ ŵotiǀes͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, ϭϬϲ; ϮϬϭϳď, 
226). She explicitly models this account of intellectual vice on a responsibilist theory of 
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epistemic virtues according to which motivations to pursue non-instrumentally epistemic 
goods are essential to virtue.7  
I have suggested that the purely motivational theory of epistemic vice is plausible with 
regard to the vice of epistemic malevolence. If, however, the theory is to be of interest, it 
must offer a plausible account of all intellectual vices or at least of all those vices that are 
character traits. Once we think of the theory as having a general application, we can readily 
think of seeming counterexamples. 
Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, Cƌeƌaƌ has aƌgued that the epoŶǇŵous ŵaiŶ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ iŶ GoŶĐhaƌoǀ͛s Ŷoǀel 
Oblomov is intellectually vicious despite lacking epistemically bad motivations of the sort 
required by motivational accounts (2017, 5).8 Oblomov shows no interest in anything. He 
loafs on his sofa because nothing, in his view, is worth his efforts.9 In this characterisation he 
is shown as lacking that deep concern for cognitive contact with reality that is sometimes 
said to be essential to every intellectual virtue (cf. Zagzebski 1996). His apparent lack of 
good motives alone, as should be obvious, does not make him a counterexample to the 
motivational account.10 Instead, what must be shown is that, first, Oblomov is intellectually 
vicious and, second, he has no relevant epistemically bad motivations. The latter point is 
arguably disputable.11 
We may support the first claim that Oblomov suffers from intellectual vices by our 
describing his behaviour as flowing from epistemic laziness.12 Oblomov, so characterised, 
has no interest in the acquisition of epistemic goods; therefore, he lacks curiosity and shows 
no inclination to initiate inquiry or to persevere with it when a question pops into his mind. 
Once his situation is described in these terms, it is open to the supporter of the motivational 
account to agree that Oblomov is vicious but to deny that he has no epistemically bad 
motivations. Instead, one may claim that his vice stems from those epistemically bad 
motivations—whatever they may be—that are characteristic of the vice of epistemic 
laziness. 
Opponents of the motivational view have an immediate response to this argument. They 
may retort that although there may be some bad epistemic motives that are associated with 
intellectual laziness, these are not the kind of motives required by motivational accounts. 
That is, they are not non-instrumental motives that actively oppose or avoid things that are 
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epistemically good in themselves. Instead, to be lazy is primarily to lack the good motives 
that would be required for virtues like inquisitives and perseverance.13 This response is 
plausible since there is a ring of truth to the thought that to be lazy is to lack the motivation 
to make an effort. Despite its plausibility, I argue in section 2 that this conclusion is 
ultimately mistaken. 
One may concur that this example shows that epistemically bad motives are not necessary 
for intellectual vice. Nevertheless, one may also think that motivations are important. For 
instance, one may claim that these vices are characterised by an absence of the good 
motivations required by virtue. This position has widespread support since it can be 
plausibly attributed to Baehr (2010), Montmarquet (2000, 138), and Zagzebski (1996).  
A deeper challenge to the motivational view of intellectual vice is presented by fictional 
examples of individuals whose motivations appear to be epistemically good but who display 
a range of seemingly vicious behaviours. Crerar discusses two cases. Since these are similar, 
I limit my discussion to the first. It concerns a scientist—Galileo—who is motivated to seek 
the truth for its own sake but who is also arrogant (2017, 7).14 Out of his sense of 
intellectual superiority Galileo underestimates the intellectual abilities of his interlocutors 
and so takes no notice of their comments. Thus, Galileo is intellectually vicious despite 
possessing the kind of motivation that is common to all intellectual virtues. 
Analogous to the Galileo case is the example of Oliver the conspiracy theorist (Cassam 2016, 
162–63). Cassam describes him as a person who is genuinely motivated to find out the truth 
but is gullible and easily led astray by the Internet. Crerar questions whether Oliver is best 
described as intellectually vicious or as possessing limited cognitive abilities (2017, 8). Be 
that as it may, it is possible to conceive of a conspiracy theorist—Olivia—who seems to be 
motivated by the truth and yet is intellectually vicious. Olivia does not want to believe 
conspiracies, come what may; she only wants to believe them if they are true. She may be 
perseverant and curious. She may even be better informed than most on the topic.15 In 
some sense, however, she also wants the conspiracies to be true, and it is this motivation 
that guides her inquiries. Hence, she has a blind spot; she is closed-minded about the falsity 
of her pet theories. In short, she displays many of the behaviours that are characteristic of 
virtue, and she is motivated to believe only what is true. She is, however, not equally 
motivated to find out whether her favourite theories are false. 
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There is also another kind of counterexample to the motivational theory of intellectual vice. 
It concerns individuals who turn vicious trying to compensate for a defect that they attribute 
to themselves. Montmarquet, for instance, imagines a person who becomes dogmatic out 
of fear that she is too gullible (1993, 25). This person—call her Gail—out of a concern for 
what is intellectually good attempts to correct for what she perceives to be a defect in her 
character. This endeavour leads her, however, to develop a tendency not to listen to 
contrary views, because she fears that she might too easily believe them. Unfortunately, she 
ends up overcompensating and thus turns herself into a dogmatic person. She seems to be 
exclusively motivated in the right ways but nevertheless ends up acquiring an intellectual 
character vice. 
If all of this is right, then epistemic bad motivations are not a defining feature of intellectual 
vice. While some character vices such as malevolence may require them, and others 
necessitate an absence of good motives, there are other vices that can be had even though 
one is exclusively driven by good motivations of the kind required for intellectual virtue. 
There would, therefore, be nothing of significance to say in general about the relation of 
intellectual character vices to motivations. 
There are reasons, however, not to rest happy with this negative conclusion. The proposal 
that vices have non-instrumental motives to avoid, oppose, or antagonise things that are in 
themselves epistemically good is intended to do much explanatory work as part of an 
account of the nature of vice. First, the proposal provides an account of what makes vices 
bad and thus grounds criticisms directed toward those who have these features. Vices 
would derive their disvalue from the disvalue of their motivational component.16 Second, 
the proposal offers a criterion for the individuation of individual vices, since each one of 
them has its distinct motivations. Third, it helps to distinguish vices from other kinds of 
intellectual shortcomings, such as incapacity, cognitive malfunction, and lack of ability or 
skill. The only intellectual shortcomings that are vices are those that have bad motivational 
states of the requisite kind among their components. If we abandon the motivational 
account of vice, it becomes at best unclear what else could take its place in these 
explanations. 
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<A, CENTERED>2 
 
In this section I argue that non-instrumental aversion to epistemic goods is at play in all the 
examples considered above. These, therefore, do not refute the motivational account of 
vice. In the next section I offer some independent reasons in support of such a view. 
Cƌeƌaƌ foĐuses oŶ Oďloŵoǀ͛s laĐk of ŵotiǀatioŶ ;ϮϬϭϳ, ϱͿ. Fuƌtheƌ, although Cƌeƌaƌ leaǀes it 
open that Oblomov may possess some bad motives, he claims that his viciousness precisely 
consists in his indifference for what is intellectually good and therefore in the absence of the 
kind of motivation required by epistemic virtue. There are, however, reasons to doubt this 
characterisation. Oblomov, if he is lazy rather than akratic, must in some sense choose not 
to bother with inquiry. He has opportunities to acquire epistemic goods that he does not 
take because he abhors making the required effort. So understood Oblomov is an agent 
who regulates his mental activity. His behaviour is guided by his motivations rather than by 
eǆteƌŶal foƌĐes. Oďloŵoǀ͛s ultiŵate ŵotiǀe is to aǀoid ŵakiŶg aŶǇ effoƌt. This ŵotiǀatioŶ 
itself is not epistemic; it is also not always bad, since effort is not unqualifiedly a good. 
Oblomov, however, also possesses other motivations, some of which are plausibly described 
as epistemic since they guide his intellectual conduct.  
Oblomov is an irresponsible epistemic agent. He is not guided by the evidence; he is 
negligent in his belief formation; he shows a lack of due care when thinking about any 
topic.17 He acts in this manner because his behaviour is driven by an aversion to making any 
intellectual effort. It is this aversion that also explains his indifference to the truth. Thus, 
although it is accurate to describe Oblomov as lacking virtuous motivations, what is most 
telling about his character is the presence of the motive actively to avoid whatever may 
require intellectual effort or application. This is the characteristic bad motivation that is 
necessary for intellectual laziness. It is a non-instrumental motivation to avoid intellectual 
labour. 
It may be objected, however, that this motivation is not of the kind demanded by 
motivational accounts, because aversion to intellectual labour is not bad in itself since what 
is being avoided is not something that is good in itself. It is true that effort is not always 
valuable. There are many domains in which effortless success is preferable to having to 
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labour for the same outcome. As Zagzebski also notes, there are many goods whose 
goodness does not depend on having to work to get them (2003, 20). These are goods that 
are desirable and include epistemic goods, such as true belief. But there are other goods 
whose goodness requires that we work for it. These are goods that are admirable and that, 
arguably, include knowledge. It is also plausible to think that intellectual work or effort is 
epistemically good in itself. We do admire people who apply themselves in the pursuit of 
intellectual inquiry, and our appreciation of them is not wholly dependent on the success of 
their endeavour. In conclusion, although much more would need to be said to establish the 
point, in the epistemic domain doing the work required by inquiry is epistemically good in 
itself because it warrants admiration. What is characteristic of epistemic laziness is aversion 
rather than indifference to effort. This aversion to application is the bad epistemic 
ŵotiǀatioŶ that eǆplaiŶs Oďloŵoǀ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ. 
Having rebutted the example purporting to show that some vices are characterised by an 
absence of good motives of the right kind, I turn my attention to three cases intended to 
show that one may be vicious despite possessing intellectually virtuous motives. Below I 
cast doubt on attributing to these fictional characters the motivation to love the truth for its 
own sake. But for now I shall not challenge the coherence of the examples and grant, for the 
sake of argument, that these individuals have virtuous motivations. 
Galileo, in the example under consideration, cares for the truth, but he is also arrogant. 
Further, his arrogance leads him to become closed-minded. It is important to distinguish 
clearly this case from another in which a Galileo-like figure—Copernicus—makes an honest 
mistake. He believes that he is intellectually superior to other people around him. 
Consequently, he may not give to their views the credit they deserve. He, however, would 
not be arrogant or closed-minded; he would be misguided.18 Therefore, this is not the case 
that we are being asked to consider, because Galileo in our example is supposed to be both 
arrogant and closed-minded.  
What is the difference between Galileo and Copernicus? I submit that a crucial difference 
lies in their motives. Suppose that they both dismiss out of hand a criticism raised by an 
opponent. If we ask why they behave in this way, however, our answers differ. Copernicus 
ŵaǇ thiŶk that the oppoŶeŶt͛s Đlaiŵ is Ŷot a geŶuiŶe ĐhalleŶge, Galileo ŵaǇ fiŶd aŶǇ 
criticism to be an affront to his intellectual standing. But even if these are not precisely their 
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motives, their similar actions will have different psychological explanations. Whatever these 
may be, it is plausible to think that those who are arrogantly closed-minded are motivated 
to preserve their sense of superiority by trying to do others down. 
The contrast with Copernicus supports this point. Copernicus has the right motivation 
without also having bad motives such as envy. He is, however, not plausibly classified as 
vicious. Galileo is ex hypothesi vicious and has good motivations. An explanation is needed, 
however, for his behaviour. His actions are intelligible if we think of Galileo as being driven 
by a desire to preserve his sense of superiority by doing others down. This motive is an 
aversion to, or strong dislike of, other people͛s episteŵiĐ aĐhieǀeŵeŶts that is also 
manifested as a delight in, and an enjoyment of, their failures.  
It is plausible to think that Galileo is non-iŶstƌuŵeŶtallǇ aǀeƌse to otheƌs͛ aĐhieǀeŵeŶts. He 
sees otheƌ people͛s suĐĐesses iŶstƌuŵeŶtallǇ as oďstacles, but he is also simply opposed to 
them for no other reason than that he dislikes the idea that others have achievements to 
their name. Further, since epistemic achievements are good in themselves, it is plausible to 
think that a motive of aversion to them is an epistemically bad motivation.  
OŶe ĐaŶ ƌuŶ a paƌallel aƌguŵeŶt to addƌess Oliǀia͛s Đase. Oliǀia has desiƌe foƌ the tƌuth, ďut 
she also wants some beliefs of hers to be true. She is therefore closed-minded, dogmatic, 
and prone to wishful thinking. But Oliva is not Oliver. She is not easily swayed because of 
limited cognitive abilities. she has mixed motivations. She cares for the truth but, because 
she is dogmatic, she is unwilling to engage with alternative views from her own (Battaly 
forthcoming). This unwillingness is the manifestation of a disposition actively to ignore 
evidence. This motive exemplifies an opposition to an epistemic good that is a component 
of epistemic responsibility: namely, the careful consideration of evidence. Further, if Olivia 
has become genuinely dogmatic rather than someone who has a blind spot for conspiracy 
theories in particular, it seems plausible to think of her as being averse to the careful 
consideration of evidence non-instrumentally, because she would find such evidence 
challenging. She does not ignore evidence exclusively as a means to achieve her goal of 
holding on to her favourite theories. 
If the above is correct, these cases are not even challenges to the view that the presence of 
motivations actively to turn away from things that are epistemically good in themselves is 
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both necessary and sufficient for intellectual vice. They would, however, undermine the 
view that good motivations of the requisite sort are sufficient for intellectual virtue. It is 
thus worth pointing out that the claim that Galileo and Olivia are motivated in the right way 
by the truth is at least open to question.19 
Since we are dealing with thumbnail examples, the psychologies of these fictional characters 
are largely under-described. Of course, one may make it a matter of stipulation that Galileo 
is motivated by the truth for its own sake. For these stories to be effective counter-
examples, however, they must possess a degree of psychological plausibility. Given that 
Galileo is described as arrogant and also as closed-minded as a result of his arrogance, it is 
extremely implausible that he would be motivated by a desire that the truth be discovered 
no matter by whom, and that he simply thinks he is best placed to discover it. Believing this, 
truly or falsely, does not make one arrogant or closed-minded. Thus, at the very least Galileo 
is only motivated to acquire truths for himself. He is not prepared to sacrifice the amount of 
truth he has access to for the greater epistemic good of the community. 
This characterisation, however, does not really fit Galileo. He is not motivated to discover as 
ŵaŶǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt tƌuths as possiďle foƌ the tƌuth͛s sake. The faĐt that he does Ŷot ǀalue the 
truth for its own sake is illustrated by the fact that he would be bitterly disappointed if he 
were not the one to discover it. One may object that his psychology may not fit this 
description. In response, I would argue that we need to be told more about his character 
than the sketchy characterisation offered by those who use the example to attribute to 
Galileo only epistemically good motivations. I would also add that a psychologically realistic 
way of filling in the picture is to portray him as not caring for the truth for its own sake but 
only caring that he is the one that discovers the truth. If I am right, Galileo is only 
instrumentally motivated by a desire for epistemic goods; he desires the truth because 
ďeiŶg the oŶe ǁho disĐoǀeƌs it eŶhaŶĐes his episteŵiĐ staŶdiŶg iŶ his oǁŶ aŶd otheƌs͛ eǇes. 
He is ultimately motivated by a desire to further inflate his own inflated self-conception. 
This fact would explain his arrogance and closed-mindedness and his apparent drive to 
discover truths.  
The final alleged counterexample to the motivational account is structurally different from 
the cases discussed above. Gail does seem to have genuinely and exclusively good 
motivations. Having discovered a temperamental weakness, she resolves to counteract it to 
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become a better inquirer. Unfortunately, she ends up overdoing it and thus starts ignoring 
objections that she should address. In my view it is not altogether clear that she suffers 
from an epistemic character vice. If we ask her why she behaves as she does, she would 
make reference to her gullible temperament, which requires her to be particularly active in 
counterbalancing this tendency. Thus, she would not be dogmatic, although she behaves in 
seemingly dogmatic ways. Her behaviour would, instead, be indicative of a series of 
misjudgements about what it takes to be ƌeĐeptiǀe to otheƌs͛ ǀieǁs ǁithout ďeiŶg too easilǇ 
swayed. 
This characterisation of Gail, however, may not ring true to some. It is psychologically 
plausible also to think of her as acquiring the vice of dogmatism through repeated acts of 
overcompensation. But if we think of her in these terms, she appears as someone who first 
deǀelops aŶ iŶstƌuŵeŶtal ŵotiǀe foƌ Ŷot listeŶiŶg to otheƌ people͛s ǀieǁs to fulfil heƌ eŶd of 
avoiding false beliefs. Over time, however, she turns herself into a dogmatic person, 
because the motive for closing her mind to opposing views becomes an end in itself. In 
short, it makes sense to think of her as possessing a vice rather than a weakness, if we think 
of her actions as constituting a process of habituation into the vice of dogmatism. Such a 
process leads Gail to act out of the motives for dogmatism automatically. Thus, her 
dogmatic responses are the result of motives that are automatically engaged.20 Therefore, 
Gail no longer considers whether the dogmatic response would serve the further purpose of 
acquiring epistemic goods. She has become dogmatic because she is averse to careful 
consideration of the relevant evidence.  Hence she ends up acquiring the same bad 
motivation as Olivia, even though the processes by means of which she acquires it are 
different. 
 
<A, CENTERED>3 
 
There is something unsatisfactory in my dispute against those who claim that motivation of 
the right kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for vice since we simply appear to trade in 
intuitions. I am sure that those who oppose motivational theories of vice may provide 
alternative accounts of the examples described above. Therefore, we appear to have 
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reached a stalemate. In what follows I provide some independent support for the idea that 
vices require non-instrumental motivations to avoid, oppose, or antagonise things that are 
in themselves epistemically good. My argument begins by considering the purpose of 
charging or, more neutrally, attributing vices to other people (Kidd 2016). It proceeds by 
deploying some distinctions that are standard in the philosophy of action to suggest that 
there is a plausible conception of vice according to which it is part of the very concept of 
vice that it is correctly attributed only to individuals whose non-instrumental motivations 
include aversion to things that are in themselves epistemically good. 
We can approach questions about the nature of intellectual vice by considering the use of 
ǀiĐe attƌiďutioŶs to eǆplaiŶ people͛s aĐtioŶs. Cassaŵ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ desĐƌiďes these attƌiďutioŶs as 
intellectual vice explanations. He characteƌises theŵ as eǆplaŶatioŶs of aŶotheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s 
beliefs or activities that are intended to undermine that belief or action as lacking any 
rational grounds and being merely a reflection of personal idiosyncrasies.21 That is to say, 
the attribution of a vice eǆplaiŶs, iŶ the seŶse of ŵakiŶg it iŶtelligiďle, a peƌsoŶ͛s ďelief oƌ 
action by showing it to flow from a psychological state of that person. The attribution also 
entails that there are no reasons that would support holding the belief or carrying out the 
action.  
While I agree with Cassam that its ability to play this explanatory role is an important 
feature of the concept of vice, I have a quibble with the idea that explanations in terms of 
vice are explanations of belief and action as a result of individual idiosyncrasies. Or at least I 
find myself in disagreement if these are understood as akin to quirks or eccentricities. 
“oŵetiŵes ǁe do eǆplaiŶ people͛s aĐtiǀities iŶ teƌŵs of theiƌ idiosǇŶĐƌasies. Thus, ǁe ŵaǇ 
say of the person who uses only a specific brand of sugar in her coffee that this behaviour is 
one of her quirks. Nonetheless, by saying so we would not be taking ourselves to criticise 
this person or attribute any particular vices to her. 
To clarify the thought that vice plays an essential role iŶ soŵe eǆplaŶatioŶs of people͛s 
beliefs and actions, it is helpful to borrow from the philosophy of action a distinction 
between three kinds of explanation: justifications, rationalisations, and mere explanation. 
An explanation justifies an action or a belief when it adduces considerations in its favour. 
These considerations are normative reasons, which is to say facts that provide rational 
grounds for the belief or the action. A rationalization adduces the reasons that the agent 
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takes to support her beliefs or actions. These reasons are known as motivating reasons; they 
are the considerations that the agent takes to offer rational support for her actions and 
beliefs and that as a result motivate her to believe and behave as she does.22 A mere 
explanation supplies ƌeasoŶs that ŵake the ageŶt͛s aĐtioŶs oƌ ďeliefs iŶtelligiďle ǁithout 
either justifying or rationalising them. Both rationalisations and mere explanations are 
psychological explanations, while justifications are not. 
An example I borrow from Maria Alvarez will help to clarify this distinction. Consider the 
killing of Desdemona by Othello. There are no normative reasons in support of his action. 
For which, therefore, there is no justifying explanation. Othello has a reason for his action, 
though. His reason is the putative fact that Desdemona was unfaithful to him.23 This is the 
consideration that motivates Othello to act. Hence, there is a rationalising explanation for 
his killing. Othello murders Desdmona because he thinks that she is unfaithful. Finally, one 
may also supply another explanation that makes his action intelligible. Othello is jealous. His 
jealousy explains why he forms the belief that Desdemona is unfaithful, and thus why he 
kills her. The motive of jealousy is not what he takes to be his reason for his behaviour. It is 
not something that rationalises his behaviour. Nevertheless, it is the psychological state that 
explains both his deliberation and his actions. It is a motive without being a reason (Alvarez 
2010, 2016).24 
Vice explanations are psychological explanations. One may wonder whether they could be 
ƌatioŶalizatioŶs oƌ ǁhetheƌ theǇ alǁaǇs fuŶĐtioŶ as ŵeƌe eǆplaŶatioŶs. Cassaŵ͛s disĐussioŶ 
is not clear on this matter. In my view there may be some rationalisations that undermine 
the belief or action as lacking rational support because the adduced motivations are plainly 
bad from a normative point of view. Actions that manifest epistemic malevolence exemplify 
this stƌuĐtuƌe. We ĐaŶ eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ a peƌsoŶ ďloĐks otheƌs͛ aĐĐess to episteŵiĐ goods by 
adducing her motivating reasons. These may include the fact that she opposes their 
epistemic well-being. This is the consideration that rationalises her actions because it 
specifies her reasons for acting as she does. It also explains her actions, since it presents the 
motivations that make these activities intelligible. 
Moƌe tǇpiĐallǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, ǀiĐe eǆplaŶatioŶs ŵake soŵeoŶe͛s aĐtioŶs oƌ ďeliefs iŶtelligiďle ďǇ 
supplying psychological motives that explain, but do not rationalise, them. An agent is 
typically unaware of possessing these motives, since bringing them to consciousness would 
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make her realise that she has no reason that rationalises her actions. For instance, an 
intellectually arrogant person may silence other people out of defensiveness.25 His 
defensiveness explains his deliberations and actions, but it is not the reason he acts as he 
does. Nevertheless, defensiveness may be an underlying motivation of his activities.  
The discussion so far indicates that if we are prepared to take seriously our use of the 
vocabulary of vice when criticising people for their beliefs and actions, then vices constitute 
psychological states that make actions intelligible and also on occasion rationalise them. 
These psychological states are the motives underlyiŶg iŶdiǀiduals͛ ďeliefs aŶd aĐtiǀities that 
may be said to reflect or manifest them. It is also part of our practice of vice charging that 
an explanation of a belief or an action as reflecting a vice implies that this belief or action 
lacks any justification. It also presupposes that the person who believes or behaves in this 
way is a legitimate target of criticism. 
There is a sense in which anyone who believes or does something that she has no 
(normative) reason to believe or do is falling short of what is normatively required. We do 
not, however, criticise or blame people who make honest mistakes or whose reasoning falls 
short of what is normatively required due to temporary or permanent impairments of their 
cognitive capacities. In these cases we may be critical of their beliefs or actions but are not 
critical of these individuals themselves.26 In this regard vice attributions are different. 
EǆplaiŶiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s ďelief oƌ aĐtioŶ as ƌefleĐtiŶg a ǀiĐe eŶtails takiŶg this peƌsoŶ to ďe a 
legitimate target of criticism.27  
These considerations raise the question of what may warrant such criticism. I contend that 
the most plausible answer is that criticism is legitimate because of the badness of the 
psǇĐhologiĐal states fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh the iŶdiǀidual͛s ďeliefs aŶd aĐtions flow. Thus, what 
grounds criticism of vicious people are the psychological states that motivate their 
behaviours, even though these states are not their reasons for their actions. The states are 
the motivational components of vice. These are bad because they are non-instrumental 
motives actively to turn away from things that are epistemically good in themselves.  
If it is granted that our practices of vice attributions presuppose that vices involve 
psychological states, which supply bad motivations without always being reasons for action, 
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we can settle my disagreement with those who claim that epistemically bad motivations are 
not necessary or sufficient for vice. 
The distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ŵotiǀatiŶg aŶd eǆplaŶatoƌǇ ƌeasoŶs sheds light oŶ Oďloŵoǀ͛s 
motivational architecture. It is plausible to attribute to Oblomov a paucity of motivating 
reasons. He does not think that anything is worth doing. Therefore, he has no reasons that 
motivate him to act. Nevertheless, it is possible to explain his behaviour in terms of his 
underlying motivations. We intuitively think that Oblomov is intellectually lazy or indolent 
because he is motivated to avoid effort. This motivational architecture explains why he does 
not see the value of seeking the truth, and why he always gives up too soon. His opposition 
to epistemic work is the ultimate epistemic motive that explains his epistemic conduct. 
The same distinction between two kinds of reason also explains the viciousness of Galileo. 
His ultimate motivation is one of self-enhancement, but his deepest epistemic motive is an 
aǀeƌsioŶ to otheƌs͛ episteŵiĐ aĐhieǀeŵeŶts. This motive explains why Galileo is arrogant; it 
also explains his rationalisations of his actions. He takes his reasons to be a love for the 
truth. But he is mistaken. The motives of self-eŶhaŶĐeŵeŶt aŶd eŶǀǇ of otheƌs͛ 
achievements bias his thinking and guide his behaviour. In short, Galileo does not really 
have epistemically good motives. Rather he is self-deceived, since his rationalisations hide 
the true motivational structure behind his activities.28 
In sum, if it is granted that our practice of charging people with vice is genuinely 
explanatory, it follows that we take vice to be at least in part constituted by a psychological 
state that eǆplaiŶs people͛s ďeliefs and actions without justifying them but normally also 
without rationalising them. Further, there is a respectable notion of motivation that 
identifies the motives for believing or doing something with the psychological states that 
explain why one believes or acts in that manner. Hence, the idea that vices have motivations 
as one of their constituents is part and parcel of our practice of vice attribution. I have not 
argued here that our practice is in order; I have assumed that it is. Hence, it is open to my 
opponents to argue that there is something mistaken with our folk practice. 
However, and I take this to offer substantial support for my view, if we do go along with our 
practice and deploy the distinction between justifications, rationalisations, and mere 
explanations, we are able to offer richer and psychologically plausible accounts of the 
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psychology of vice. The richness of these descriptions, when contrasted with the sketchiness 
of the accounts of those who claim that motivations are neither necessary nor sufficient 
forvice, is evidence for the motivational account. The arguments offered here do not show 
that bad motivations are sufficient for vice, but—I hope—they do provide evidence that 
they are necessary. 
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<FOOTNOTES> 
 
1 IŶ this papeƌ I tƌeat ͞iŶtelleĐtual ǀiĐe͟ aŶd ͞episteŵiĐ ǀiĐe͟ as sǇŶoŶǇŵous eǆpƌessioŶs. 
Intellectually vicious individuals also possess other non-instrumental motives that are not 
epistemic in character. For instance, they may be motivated by power or self-interest. 
Human actions are often done for more than one motive, including more than one that is 
not instrumental. I set these issues aside here. 
2 )agzeski͛s foƌŵulates tǁo distiŶĐt aĐĐouŶts of the ǀalue of ŵotiǀatioŶs. The fiƌst is 
eudaimonic. Motivations are good because they are aimed as something that is good since it 
is a constituent of the good life. The second is motivation based. It identifies some 
motivations which are good in themselves and whose goodness confers value on their ends. 
Other virtue responsibilists are not so clear on these points. They are also often unclear 
about the source of the goodness of good motivations. When they use the teƌŵ ͞iŶtƌiŶsiĐ͟ 
to refer to good motives, it is often unclear whether they are referring to things that are 
good in themselves or to things that are valued non-instrumentally. See Kosgaard (1983) for 
a clear statement of this distinction.  
3 My sole concern here is with character vices such as laziness and arrogance. Intellectual 
vices may not be restricted to character traits, since they may include habits of thought such 
as wishful thinking (Cassam 2016, 160). In this paper I set this issue aside. 
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4 Baehr explains being opposed to the epistemic good in itself for its own sake in terms of 
ŵakiŶg the episteŵiĐ good oŶe͛s eŶeŵǇ ;ϮϬϭϬ, ϭϵϯ–94). He also thinks that malevolence 
may not always be a vice, because its characteristic motive may co-exist with a sufficiently 
good ultimate epistemic motivation (2010, 190, n. 2). I find this deeply implausible but shall 
not pursue it here. 
5 Here and throughout this section I rely on what I hope are shared intuitions about whether 
an individual is vicious. There are some worrying limitations to this methodology. I adopt it 
here because it has been used in the arguments against the motivational account of vice 
that I wish to oppose. 
6 This characterisation of malevolence presupposes that malevolence is a bad motive 
because its aim is to oppose something that is independently good. Alternatively, one could 
argue that being ill willed is bad in itself. It is the badness of ill will that would make 
antagonising the epistemic good a bad thing. 
7 BattalǇ͛s ŶotioŶ of aŶ epistemically bad motive is not wholly clear. It at least requires that 
it is a non-instrumental motivation to pursue something that is bad (either in itself or 
because of its effects). 
8 Crerar is not committed to the view that Oblomov has no motivations that are in some 
sense epistemically bad. He is instead committed to the claim that these motivations are not 
bad in the sense required by motivational accounts. 
9 Oblomov is also discussed by Gabriele Taylor (2006, 19–21), who describes him as the 
archetype of sloth and indolence. 
10 An individual, for instance, may have an instrumental concern for the truth without being 
intellectually vicious.  
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11 One may also take issues with the description of Oblomov as intellectually vicious. In the 
book he is often described as being riven by anxieties. He is confined to his bed because of 
his inability to prioritise. So described, he appears to be not slothful but akratic. He may care 
for the truth but against his better judgement finds himself unable to regulate his mental 
activity in line with his motivations. 
12 Kidd (manuscript) provides an account of intellectual laziness. BattalǇ͛s ;ϮϬϭϳaͿ ǀiĐe of 
capitulation is also closely related to laziness and indolence. See also Baehr (2011, 19, 70) 
and Zagzebski (1996, 152) for some brief remarks. 
13 See Watson (2015) for an account of inquisitiveness and Battaly (2017a) for perseverance. 
14 Crerar borrows this example from Roberts and Wood (2007, 254). 
15 That is to say, she may have more true beliefs on the topic than most people. Of course, 
she also has more false beliefs than most. This fact alone does not make her ill informed. 
Presumably, anybody who cares about a given subject has more false beliefs than those 
who have not given it any thought. 
16 Further motivations may be the ultimate source of disvalue or they may be bad because 
they oppose or avoid that which is epistemically good in itself. It should be noted that 
explanations that ground the badness of vice on something other than motivations are also 
possible, since attributions of blame may not require bad motivations.  
17 See Cassam (2016, 166) for a characterisation of the obligations of responsible inquiry. 
18 For defences of this position see Tanesini 2016, 516, and Roberts and Wood 2007, 243. 
Crerar has commented in a private communication that he does not envisage Galileo to be 
epistemically selfish. I think what he has in mind is a person who cares for the truth and 
wrongly but honestly thinks he is intellectually better than other people. Such a person in 
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my view would not count as being arrogant. Hence, he would not be a counterexample to 
the motivational approach. 
19 For reason of space I develop the point only with regard to the Galileo example. 
20 For an account of automaticity Rees and Webber (2014). 
21 Cassam focuses exclusively on explanations of belief, but attributions of vice are used as 
often in explanations of behaviour. 
22 I leave it an open question whether normative and motivating reasons are essentially the 
same kind of thing—putative facts—or whether they are different because motivating 
reasons are psychological states. 
23 Alternatively, one may say that the belief that DesdeŵoŶa ǁas uŶfaithful is Othello͛s 
motivation reason. If one adopts this stance, one takes motivating reasons to differ in kind 
from normative reasons. Nothing in my paper hangs on this issue. 
24 Not all psychological explanations of action invoke motives. Some, for example, may 
explain actions in terms of impairments. 
25 See Tanesini 2016 for a discussion of the plausibility of defensiveness as a deep motive for 
arrogance. 
26 It might be claimed instead that we do criticise these people, even though we do not 
blame them. For this view see Montmarquet (2000, 132). Be that as it may, we are more 
critical of people for their vices than for their cognitive defects. 
27 I wish to set aside here the further question whether we also think vice attributions 
warrant blaming the person for her viciousness and the behaviours that flow from it. Battaly 
(2016), for instance, has argued that we may not always want to blame people for their 
intellectual vices. Cassam (manuscript, chap. 1) also considers this. 
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28 This fact explains the stealthiness of arrogance (Cassam 2015). It is because arrogance 
always involves a kind of self-deception that it is hard to cure oneself of it. 
